CAPEC-38: Leveraging/Manipulating Configuration File Search Paths |
 Description This pattern of attack sees an adversary load a malicious resource into a program's standard path so that when a known command is executed then the system instead executes the malicious component. The adversary can either modify the search path a program uses, like a PATH variable or classpath, or they can manipulate resources on the path to point to their malicious components. J2EE applications and other component based applications that are built from multiple binaries can have very long list of dependencies to execute. If one of these libraries and/or references is controllable by the attacker then application controls can be circumvented by the attacker. Likelihood Of Attack Typical Severity Prerequisites
| The attacker must be able to write to redirect search paths on the victim host. |
Skills Required
[Level: Low] To identify and execute against an over-privileged system interface |
Consequences  This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the attack pattern. The Scope identifies the security property that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in their attack. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a pattern will be used to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.| Scope | Impact | Likelihood |
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Confidentiality Integrity Availability | Execute Unauthorized Commands | | Confidentiality Access Control Authorization | Gain Privileges | |
Mitigations
| Design: Enforce principle of least privilege |
| Design: Ensure that the program's compound parts, including all system dependencies, classpath, path, and so on, are secured to the same or higher level assurance as the program |
| Implementation: Host integrity monitoring |
Example Instances
Another method is to redirect commands by aliasing one legitimate command to another to create unexpected results. the Unix command "rm" could be aliased to "mv" and move all files the victim thinks they are deleting to a directory the attacker controls. In a Unix shell .profile setting alias rm=mv /usr/home/attacker In this case the attacker retains a copy of all the files the victim attempts to remove. |
A standard UNIX path looks similar to this /bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin If the attacker modifies the path variable to point to a locale that includes malicious resources then the user unwittingly can execute commands on the attackers' behalf: /evildir/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin This is a form of usurping control of the program and the attack can be done on the classpath, database resources, or any other resources built from compound parts. At runtime detection and blocking of this attack is nearly impossible, because the configuration allows execution. |
Taxonomy Mappings CAPEC mappings to ATT&CK techniques leverage an inheritance model to streamline and minimize direct CAPEC/ATT&CK mappings. Inheritance of a mapping is indicated by text stating that the parent CAPEC has relevant ATT&CK mappings. Note that the ATT&CK Enterprise Framework does not use an inheritance model as part of the mapping to CAPEC.Relevant to the ATT&CK taxonomy mapping (also see parent) | Entry ID | Entry Name |
|---|
| 1574.007 | Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable | | 1574.009 | Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by Unquoted Path |
References
[REF-1] G. Hoglund and
G. McGraw. "Exploiting Software: How to Break Code". Addison-Wesley. 2004-02.
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 Content History | Submissions |
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| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization |
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| 2014-06-23 (Version 2.6) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | | Modifications |
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| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization |
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| 2018-07-31 (Version 2.12) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | Updated Description, Description Summary, Examples-Instances, Related_Weaknesses | | 2019-04-04 (Version 3.1) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | Updated Related_Weaknesses | | 2020-07-30 (Version 3.3) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | Updated Taxonomy_Mappings | | 2022-09-29 (Version 3.8) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | Updated Example_Instances, Taxonomy_Mappings |
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