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Home > CAPEC List > CAPEC-474: Signature Spoofing by Key Theft (Version 3.9)  

CAPEC-474: Signature Spoofing by Key Theft

Attack Pattern ID: 474
Abstraction: Detailed
View customized information:
+ Description
An attacker obtains an authoritative or reputable signer's private signature key by theft and then uses this key to forge signatures from the original signer to mislead a victim into performing actions that benefit the attacker.
+ Likelihood Of Attack

Medium

+ Typical Severity

High

+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the other attack patterns and high level categories that are related to this attack pattern. These relationships are defined as ChildOf and ParentOf, and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as CanFollow, PeerOf, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar attack patterns that the user may want to explore.
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfStandard Attack PatternStandard Attack Pattern - A standard level attack pattern in CAPEC is focused on a specific methodology or technique used in an attack. It is often seen as a singular piece of a fully executed attack. A standard attack pattern is meant to provide sufficient details to understand the specific technique and how it attempts to accomplish a desired goal. A standard level attack pattern is a specific type of a more abstract meta level attack pattern.473Signature Spoof
Section HelpThis table shows the views that this attack pattern belongs to and top level categories within that view.
View NameTop Level Categories
Domains of AttackSoftware
Mechanisms of AttackEngage in Deceptive Interactions
+ Prerequisites
An authoritative or reputable signer is storing their private signature key with insufficient protection.
+ Skills Required
[Level: Low]
Knowledge of common location methods and access methods to sensitive data
[Level: High]
Ability to compromise systems containing sensitive data
+ Mitigations
Restrict access to private keys from non-supervisory accounts
Restrict access to administrative personnel and processes only
Ensure all remote methods are secured
Ensure all services are patched and up to date
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Section HelpCAPEC mappings to ATT&CK techniques leverage an inheritance model to streamline and minimize direct CAPEC/ATT&CK mappings. Inheritance of a mapping is indicated by text stating that the parent CAPEC has relevant ATT&CK mappings. Note that the ATT&CK Enterprise Framework does not use an inheritance model as part of the mapping to CAPEC.
Relevant to the ATT&CK taxonomy mapping (also see parent)
Entry IDEntry Name
1552.004Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys
+ References
[REF-411] Sigbjørn Vik. "Security breach stopped". http://my.opera.com/securitygroup/blog/2013/06/26/opera-infrastructure-attack. 2013-06-26.
[REF-412] Patrick Morley. "Bit9 and Our Customers’ Security". https://blog.bit9.com/2013/02/08/bit9-and-our-customers-security/. 2013-02-08.
[REF-413] Brad Arkin. "Inappropriate Use of Adobe Code Signing Certificate". http://blogs.adobe.com/asset/2012/09/inappropriate-use-of-adobe-code-signing-certificate.html. 2012-09-27.
+ Content History
Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2014-06-23
(Version 2.6)
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2019-04-04
(Version 3.1)
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Updated Related_Weaknesses
2020-12-17
(Version 3.4)
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Updated Mitigations
2022-09-29
(Version 3.8)
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Updated Taxonomy_Mappings
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Page Last Updated or Reviewed: July 31, 2018
 

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