CAPEC-48: Passing Local Filenames to Functions That Expect a URL |
Description This attack relies on client side code to access local files and resources instead of URLs. When the client browser is expecting a URL string, but instead receives a request for a local file, that execution is likely to occur in the browser process space with the browser's authority to local files. The attacker can send the results of this request to the local files out to a site that they control. This attack may be used to steal sensitive authentication data (either local or remote), or to gain system profile information to launch further attacks. Likelihood Of Attack Typical Severity Execution Flow Explore Identify web application URL inputs: Review application inputs to find those that are designed to be URLs. | Techniques |
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| Manually navigate web site pages to identify URLs. | | Use automated tools to identify URLs. |
Experiment Identify URL inputs allowing local access.: Execute test local commands via each URL input to determine which are successful. | Techniques |
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| Manually execute a local command (such as 'pwd') via the URL inputs. | | Using an automated tool, test each URL input for weakness. |
Exploit Execute malicious commands: Using the identified URL inputs that allow local command execution, execute malicious commands. | Techniques |
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| Execute local commands via the URL input. |
Prerequisites
| The victim's software must not differentiate between the location and type of reference passed the client software, e.g. browser |
Skills Required
[Level: Medium] Attacker identifies known local files to exploit |
Consequences This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the attack pattern. The Scope identifies the security property that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in their attack. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a pattern will be used to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.| Scope | Impact | Likelihood |
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Confidentiality | Read Data | | Integrity | Modify Data | |
Mitigations
| Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized against an acceptable content specification. |
| Implementation: Ensure all configuration files and resource are either removed or protected when promoting code into production. |
| Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting. |
| Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content. |
| Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content. |
| Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as JavaScript in browser |
Example Instances
J2EE applications frequently use .properties files to store configuration information including JDBC connections, LDAP connection strings, proxy information, system passwords and other system metadata that is valuable to attackers looking to probe the system or bypass policy enforcement points. When these files are stored in publicly accessible directories and are allowed to be read by the public user, then an attacker can list the directory identify a .properties file and simply load its contents in the browser listing its contents. A standard Hibernate properties file contains hibernate.connection.driver_class = org.postgresql.Driver hibernate.connection.url = jdbc:postgresql://localhost/mydatabase hibernate.connection.username = username hibernate.connection.password = password hibernate.c3p0.min_size=5 hibernate.c3p0.max_size=20 Even if the attacker cannot write this file, there is plenty of information to leverage to gain further access. |
References
[REF-1] G. Hoglund and
G. McGraw. "Exploiting Software: How to Break Code". Addison-Wesley. 2004-02.
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Content History | Submissions |
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| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization |
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| 2014-06-23 (Version 2.6) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | | Modifications |
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| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization |
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| 2015-12-07 (Version 2.8) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | Updated Related_Attack_Patterns | | 2017-08-04 (Version 2.11) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | Updated Attack_Phases, Description, Description Summary, References | | 2018-07-31 (Version 2.12) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | Updated Attack_Phases | | 2020-07-30 (Version 3.3) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | Updated Related_Attack_Patterns | | 2020-12-17 (Version 3.4) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | Updated @Abstraction | | 2022-09-29 (Version 3.8) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | Updated Example_Instances |
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