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Home > CAPEC List > CAPEC-546: Incomplete Data Deletion in a Multi-Tenant Environment (Version 3.9)  

CAPEC-546: Incomplete Data Deletion in a Multi-Tenant Environment

Attack Pattern ID: 546
Abstraction: Detailed
View customized information:
+ Description
An adversary obtains unauthorized information due to insecure or incomplete data deletion in a multi-tenant environment. If a cloud provider fails to completely delete storage and data from former cloud tenants' systems/resources, once these resources are allocated to new, potentially malicious tenants, the latter can probe the provided resources for sensitive information still there.
+ Likelihood Of Attack

Low

+ Typical Severity

Medium

+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the other attack patterns and high level categories that are related to this attack pattern. These relationships are defined as ChildOf and ParentOf, and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as CanFollow, PeerOf, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar attack patterns that the user may want to explore.
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfStandard Attack PatternStandard Attack Pattern - A standard level attack pattern in CAPEC is focused on a specific methodology or technique used in an attack. It is often seen as a singular piece of a fully executed attack. A standard attack pattern is meant to provide sufficient details to understand the specific technique and how it attempts to accomplish a desired goal. A standard level attack pattern is a specific type of a more abstract meta level attack pattern.545Pull Data from System Resources
Section HelpThis table shows the views that this attack pattern belongs to and top level categories within that view.
View NameTop Level Categories
Domains of AttackSoftware, Hardware
Mechanisms of AttackCollect and Analyze Information
+ Prerequisites
The cloud provider must not assuredly delete part or all of the sensitive data for which they are responsible.The adversary must have the ability to interact with the system.
+ Skills Required
[Level: Low]
The adversary requires the ability to traverse directory structure.
+ Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the attack pattern. The Scope identifies the security property that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in their attack. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a pattern will be used to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
ScopeImpactLikelihood
Confidentiality
Read Data
+ Mitigations
Cloud providers should completely delete data to render it irrecoverable and inaccessible from any layer and component of infrastructure resources.
Deletion of data should be completed promptly when requested.
+ Taxonomy Mappings
Section HelpCAPEC mappings to ATT&CK techniques leverage an inheritance model to streamline and minimize direct CAPEC/ATT&CK mappings. Inheritance of a mapping is indicated by text stating that the parent CAPEC has relevant ATT&CK mappings. Note that the ATT&CK Enterprise Framework does not use an inheritance model as part of the mapping to CAPEC.
Relevant to the ATT&CK taxonomy mapping (see parent )
+ References
[REF-461] Kopo M. Ramokapane, Awais Rashid and Jose M. Such. "Assured Deletion in the Cloud: Requirements, Challenges and Future Directions". Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). Proceedings of the 2016 ACM on Cloud Computing Security Workshop. <https://nms.kcl.ac.uk/jose.such/pubs/Assured_deletion.pdf>.
+ Content History
Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2014-06-23
(Version 2.6)
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2015-11-09
(Version 2.7)
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2017-08-04
(Version 2.11)
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences, Attack_Prerequisites, Attacker_Skills_or_Knowledge_Required, Description Summary, References, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity
2018-07-31
(Version 2.12)
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Updated Related_Weaknesses
2020-07-30
(Version 3.3)
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Updated Related_Weaknesses
2021-10-21
(Version 3.6)
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Updated @Name
Previous Entry Names
Change DatePrevious Entry Name
2021-10-21
(Version 3.6)
Probe Application Memory
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Page Last Updated or Reviewed: October 21, 2021
 

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