CAPEC-631: SoundSquatting |
Description An adversary registers a domain name that sounds the same as a trusted domain, but has a different spelling. A SoundSquatting attack takes advantage of a user's confusion of the two words to direct Internet traffic to adversary-controlled destinations. SoundSquatting does not require an attack against the trusted domain or complicated reverse engineering. Alternate Terms Likelihood Of Attack Typical Severity Execution Flow Explore Determine target website: The adversary first determines which website to impersonate, generally one that is trusted, receives a consistent amount of traffic, and is a homophone. | Techniques |
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| Research popular or high traffic websites which are also homophones. |
Experiment Impersonate trusted domain: In order to impersonate the trusted domain, the adversary needs to register the SoundSquatted URL. | Techniques |
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| Register the SoundSquatted domain. |
Exploit Deceive user into visiting domain: Finally, the adversary needs to deceive a user into visiting the SoundSquatted domain. | Techniques |
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| Execute a phishing attack and send a user an e-mail convincing the user to click on a link leading the user to the SoundSquatted domain. | | Assume that a user will unintentionally use the homophone in the URL, leading the user to the SoundSquatted domain. |
Prerequisites
| An adversary requires knowledge of popular or high traffic domains, that could be used to deceive potential targets. |
Skills Required
[Level: Low] Adversaries must be able to register DNS hostnames/URL’s. |
Consequences This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the attack pattern. The Scope identifies the security property that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in their attack. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a pattern will be used to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.| Scope | Impact | Likelihood |
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Other | Other | |
Mitigations
| Authenticate all servers and perform redundant checks when using DNS hostnames. |
| Purchase potential SoundSquatted domains and forward to legitimate domain. |
Example Instances
An adversary sends an email, impersonating the popular banking website guaranteebanking.com, to a user stating that they have just received a new deposit and to click the given link to confirm the deposit. However, the link the in email is guarantybanking.com instead of guaranteebanking.com, which the user clicks without fully reading the link. The user is directed to the adversary's website, which appears as if it is the legitimate guaranteebanking.com login page. The user thinks they are logging into their account, but have actually just given their guaranteebanking.com credentials to the adversary. The adversary can now use the user's legitimate guaranteebanking.com credentials to log into the user's account and steal any money which may be in the account. See also: SoundSquatting vulnerability allows an adversary to impersonate a trusted domain and leverages a user's confusion between the meaning of two words which are pronounced the same into visiting the malicious website to steal user credentials. |
Taxonomy Mappings CAPEC mappings to ATT&CK techniques leverage an inheritance model to streamline and minimize direct CAPEC/ATT&CK mappings. Inheritance of a mapping is indicated by text stating that the parent CAPEC has relevant ATT&CK mappings. Note that the ATT&CK Enterprise Framework does not use an inheritance model as part of the mapping to CAPEC.Relevant to the ATT&CK taxonomy mapping (see
parent
) References Content History | Submissions |
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| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization |
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| 2015-11-09 (Version 2.7) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | | Modifications |
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| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization |
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| 2018-07-31 (Version 2.12) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | Updated Attack_Phases | | 2019-04-04 (Version 3.1) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | Updated Related_Attack_Patterns | | 2020-12-17 (Version 3.4) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | Updated Related_Attack_Patterns | | 2022-09-29 (Version 3.8) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | Updated Related_Attack_Patterns |
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