CAPEC-632: Homograph Attack via Homoglyphs |
Description An adversary registers a domain name containing a homoglyph, leading the registered domain to appear the same as a trusted domain. A homograph attack leverages the fact that different characters among various character sets look the same to the user. Homograph attacks must generally be combined with other attacks, such as phishing attacks, in order to direct Internet traffic to the adversary-controlled destinations. Alternate Terms Likelihood Of Attack Typical Severity Execution Flow Explore Determine target website: The adversary first determines which website to impersonate, generally one that is trusted and receives a consistent amount of traffic. | Techniques |
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| Research popular or high traffic websites. |
Experiment Impersonate trusted domain: In order to impersonate the trusted domain, the adversary needs to register the URL containing the homoglpyh character(s). | Techniques |
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| Register the Homograph domain. |
Exploit Deceive user into visiting domain: Finally, the adversary needs to deceive a user into visiting the Homograph domain. | Techniques |
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| Execute a phishing attack and send a user an e-mail convincing the to click on a link leading the user to the malicious domain. |
Prerequisites
| An adversary requires knowledge of popular or high traffic domains, that could be used to deceive potential targets. |
Skills Required
[Level: Low] Adversaries must be able to register DNS hostnames/URL’s. |
Consequences This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the attack pattern. The Scope identifies the security property that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in their attack. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a pattern will be used to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.| Scope | Impact | Likelihood |
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Other | Other | |
Mitigations
| Authenticate all servers and perform redundant checks when using DNS hostnames. |
| Utilize browsers that can warn users if URLs contain characters from different character sets. |
Example Instances
An adversary sends an email, impersonating bankofamerica.com to a user stating that they have just received a new deposit and to click the given link to confirm the deposit. However, the link the in email is bankofamerica.com, where the 'a' and 'e' characters are Cyrillic and not ASCII, instead of bankofamerica.com (all ASCII), which the user clicks after carefully reading the URL, making sure that typosquatting and soundsquatting attacks are not being leveraged against them. The user is directed to the adversary's website, which appears as if it is the legitimate bankofamerica.com login page. The user thinks they are logging into their account, but have actually just given their bankofamerica.com credentials to the adversary. The adversary can now use the user's legitimate bankofamerica.com credentials to log into the user's account and steal any money which may be in the account. Homograph vulnerability allows an adversary to impersonate a trusted domain by leveraging homoglyphs and tricking a user into visiting the malicious website to steal user credentials. See also: CVE-2012-0584 CVE-2009-0652 CVE-2005-0233 CVE-2005-0234 CVE-2005-0235 CVE-2005-0236 CVE-2005-0237 CVE-2005-0238 |
Taxonomy Mappings CAPEC mappings to ATT&CK techniques leverage an inheritance model to streamline and minimize direct CAPEC/ATT&CK mappings. Inheritance of a mapping is indicated by text stating that the parent CAPEC has relevant ATT&CK mappings. Note that the ATT&CK Enterprise Framework does not use an inheritance model as part of the mapping to CAPEC.Relevant to the ATT&CK taxonomy mapping (see
parent
) Content History | Submissions |
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| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization |
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| 2015-11-09 (Version 2.7) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | | Modifications |
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| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization |
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| 2018-07-31 (Version 2.12) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | Updated Attack_Phases | | 2019-04-04 (Version 3.1) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | Updated Related_Attack_Patterns | | 2020-12-17 (Version 3.4) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | Updated Related_Attack_Patterns | | 2022-09-29 (Version 3.8) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | Updated Related_Attack_Patterns | | 2023-01-24 (Version 3.9) | CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | | Updated Related_Weaknesses |
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