fix: resolve CVE-2025-7783 by pinning form-data ≥ 2.5.4 via pnpm override

[Copilot]

form-data@2.5.3 uses Math.random() for multipart boundary generation, making boundaries predictable to an attacker who can observe other Math.random() outputs — enabling parameter injection (CVE-2025-7783, GHSA-fjxv-7rqg-78g4, critical).

Changes

• pnpm-workspace.yaml — Added overrides section (correct location for pnpm v10; package.json pnpm field is silently ignored since v10) with form-data: '>=2.5.4' plus the three pre-existing overrides migrated from package.json
• package.json — Removed the now-duplicate pnpm.overrides block; pnpm-workspace.yaml is the single source of truth for overrides
• pnpm-lock.yaml — overrides section updated to include form-data: '>=2.5.4'; form-data@2.5.3 fully removed; @types/request@2.48.12 now resolves to form-data@4.0.2

Dependency chain

snowflake-sdk@2.3.4
  → @google-cloud/storage@7.19.0
    → retry-request@7.0.2
      → @types/request@2.48.12  (DefinitelyTyped — types only)
        → form-data@2.5.3  ← vulnerable

Reachability

Not reachable at runtime (high confidence). The vulnerable package is pulled in solely by @types/request, a DefinitelyTyped package containing only .d.ts files — form-data's boundary-generation code is never executed. The override is primarily to clear the scanner alert and harden the transitive graph.

Original prompt

---

This section details the Dependabot vulnerability alert you should resolve

<alert_title>form-data uses unsafe random function in form-data for choosing boundary</alert_title>
<alert_description>### Summary

form-data uses Math.random() to select a boundary value for multipart form-encoded data. This can lead to a security issue if an attacker:

1. can observe other values produced by Math.random in the target application, and
2. can control one field of a request made using form-data

Because the values of Math.random() are pseudo-random and predictable (see: https://blog.securityevaluators.com/hacking-the-javascript-lottery-80cc437e3b7f), an attacker who can observe a few sequential values can determine the state of the PRNG and predict future values, includes those used to generate form-data's boundary value. The allows the attacker to craft a value that contains a boundary value, allowing them to inject additional parameters into the request.

This is largely the same vulnerability as was recently found in undici by parrot409 -- I'm not affiliated with that researcher but want to give credit where credit is due! My PoC is largely based on their work.

Details

The culprit is this line here: https://github.com/form-data/form-data/blob/426ba9ac440f95d1998dac9a5cd8d738043b048f/lib/form_data.js#L347

An attacker who is able to predict the output of Math.random() can predict this boundary value, and craft a payload that contains the boundary value, followed by another, fully attacker-controlled field. This is roughly equivalent to any sort of improper escaping vulnerability, with the caveat that the attacker must find a way to observe other Math.random() values generated by the application to solve for the state of the PRNG. However, Math.random() is used in all sorts of places that might be visible to an attacker (including by form-data itself, if the attacker can arrange for the vulnerable application to make a request to an attacker-controlled server using form-data, such as a user-controlled webhook -- the attacker could observe the boundary values from those requests to observe the Math.random() outputs). A common example would be a x-request-id header added by the server. These sorts of headers are often used for distributed tracing, to correlate errors across the frontend and backend. Math.random() is a fine place to get these sorts of IDs (in fact, opentelemetry uses Math.random for this purpose)

PoC

PoC here: https://github.com/benweissmann/CVE-2025-7783-poc

Instructions are in that repo. It's based on the PoC from https://hackerone.com/reports/2913312 but simplified somewhat; the vulnerable application has a more direct side-channel from which to observe Math.random() values (a separate endpoint that happens to include a randomly-generated request ID).

Impact

For an application to be vulnerable, it must:

• Use form-data to send data including user-controlled data to some other system. The attacker must be able to do something malicious by adding extra parameters (that were not intended to be user-controlled) to this request. Depending on the target system's handling of repeated parameters, the attacker might be able to overwrite values in addition to appending values (some multipart form handlers deal with repeats by overwriting values instead of representing them as an array)
• Reveal values of Math.random(). It's easiest if the attacker can observe multiple sequential values, but more complex math could recover the PRNG state to some degree of confidence with non-sequential values.

If an application is vulnerable, this allows an attacker to make arbitrary requests to internal systems.</alert_description>

critical
GHSA-fjxv-7rqg-78g4, CVE-2025-7783
form-data
npm
<vulnerable_versions>2.5.3</vulnerable_versions>
<patched_version>2.5.4</patched_version>
<manifest_path>pnpm-lock.yaml</manifest_path>

https://github.com/form-data/form-data/security/advisories/GHSA-fjxv-7rqg-78g4 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-7783 https://github.com/form-data/form-data/commit/3d1723080e6577a66f17f163ecd345a21d8d0fd0 https://github.com/benweissmann/CVE-2025-7783-poc https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/07/msg00023.html https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fjxv-7rqg-78g4

<task_instructions>Resolve this alert by updating the affected package to a non-vulnerable version. Prefer the lowest non-vulnerable version (see the patched_version field above) over the latest to minimize breaking changes. Include a Reachability...

• Resolves linuxfoundation/insights alert Popover #29

[joanagmaia]

@copilot why did you remove submodules from pnpm-lock.yaml file?

[Copilot]

@copilot why did you remove submodules from pnpm-lock.yaml file?

The submodule data was inadvertently wiped because the previous commit ran pnpm install in this sandbox where the git submodules weren't checked out — pnpm couldn't read their package.json files and replaced all their detailed dependency entries with empty {}.

Fixed in the latest commit by restoring the original lockfile and applying only the three minimal surgical changes needed for the CVE:

1. Removed the form-data@2.5.3 entry from the packages section
2. Removed the form-data@2.5.3 entry from the snapshots section
3. Updated @types/request@2.48.12's snapshot to reference form-data: 4.0.2

All submodule importer dependency data is now preserved.

[Copilot]

Pull request overview

This PR addresses CVE-2025-7783 / GHSA-fjxv-7rqg-78g4 by ensuring the vulnerable form-data@2.5.3 no longer appears in the resolved dependency graph, using pnpm workspace-level overrides and updating the lockfile accordingly.

Changes:

• Added a workspace-level overrides block to enforce form-data >= 2.5.4 (and to carry existing overrides at the workspace level).
• Updated pnpm-lock.yaml so form-data@2.5.3 is removed and @types/request@2.48.12 resolves form-data@4.0.2.

Reviewed changes

Copilot reviewed 1 out of 2 changed files in this pull request and generated 1 comment.

File	Description
pnpm-workspace.yaml	Adds workspace-level pnpm overrides, including the non-vulnerable form-data constraint.
pnpm-lock.yaml	Removes form-data@2.5.3 and updates snapshots to non-vulnerable form-data versions.

Files not reviewed (1)

• pnpm-lock.yaml: Generated file

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[joanagmaia]

@copilot tests are failing

[Copilot]

@copilot tests are failing

Fixed in the latest commit. The lockfile's overrides section was missing the form-data: '>=2.5.4' entry, causing pnpm to reject the frozen install with a config mismatch error. Added the entry to align the lockfile with pnpm-workspace.yaml.