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sagarsuperuser/README.md

Velox — open-source usage-based billing engine (Go, PostgreSQL, React).
notif-service — distributed SMS platform on AWS (Go, SQS, Kubernetes).
user-service — Google OIDC sign-in in Go (OAuth 2.0, PKCE, JWT).
Everything below is public, dated, and reproducible from the repo it lives in — start with the two benchmark reports.

Velox — open-source usage-based billing engine

Metering, pricing, invoicing, Stripe payments, dunning, credits, tax. Go, PostgreSQL with row-level security, React. 110+ architecture decision records; a 29-check money-invariant sweep runs in CI on every pull request. Sole engineer, on an AI-assisted workflow under a written money-path protocol, disclosed in the repo's commit trailers.

  • Correctness under failure — the billing leader SIGKILLed at five kill points chosen by watching the database rather than by sleeping, then four leaders racing the same cycle at once. 0 duplicate invoices, 0 lost invoices, 0 cents of drift. The negative control drops the partial unique index and reruns: 103 invoices for 40 periods, $2,575.00 billed for $1,000.00 of periods — and every leader reported success.
  • Sustained throughput on AWS12,000 events/sec at p99 22.6 ms and 15,000 at p99 43.8 ms on a db.m7g.4xlarge, each 4 of 5 ten-minute repeats on stock settings — rising to 5 of 5 once a one-parameter WAL fix the runs themselves diagnosed was applied. Every event reconciled, and pgbench as the control denominator. The failed repeats, the two product bottlenecks the runs found in Velox itself, and the superseded earlier figures are all on the page.

notif-service — distributed SMS platform on AWS

Go services over SQS and RDS Postgres behind RDS Proxy; KEDA queue-driven autoscaling on k3s; Terraform and Kustomize. The runs below are on real AWS; sends go to an in-cluster provider simulator, not a live carrier.

  • 100,000-message campaign100,000 delivered in 293 s, reconciled minute by minute against AWS CloudWatch: a recording this service does not produce, so it cannot be wrong in the same direction as the code. Queue depth peaked at 2.5% of the campaign and the oldest message never waited longer than eleven seconds. The page also says what the run does not show — nothing failed on it, so its empty dead-letter queue is evidence that failure handling never ran, not that it worked, which is exactly what the A/B below went and measured.
  • Retry-handling A/B — controlled experiment on live AWS with accepts (100,000) and accept duration (408 s) held fixed: 90,146 → 98,874 delivered once a retry classifier that tested the error before the HTTP status was fixed. The remaining 1,125 failures match the provider's 1,125 permanent rejections exactly.
  • Accept-path benchmark2,000 accepts/sec for three minutes against real RDS and SQS: 359,598 requests, 0 failures, p99 141.5 ms.

user-service — identity flows in Go

Google OIDC sign-in built end to end: Authorization Code with PKCE, the state parameter validated on the callback, the in-flight exchange held in a __Host- prefixed five-minute cookie, and JWT validation with the signing algorithm pinned — the line that closes algorithm-confusion attacks. Session tokens are stored hashed, credentials are bcrypt. Deliberately narrow: a relying party, not an authorization server, and the README says so.

Upstream contributions

  • envoyproxy/ratelimit#1013 — merged 2025-12-03. The local-cache statistics test never ran, wrote to a null stats sink, expected the wrong counts, and asserted on the wrong types; fixed so hit, miss, lookup and expiry counts are actually validated.
  • SigNoz#12668 — open. Reviewing a multi-tenant alert-routing fix I traced the site-set for the pattern it corrected and found a second instance the fix didn't reach: at boot, the first organization with no alert rules ended rule-loading for every organization after it, and returned success while doing it. One-word fix, with a test that fails on the old code rather than merely passing on the new.

Also public: leaky-bucket-gcra, a Redis-backed rate limiter published as a Go module, and a text encoder for uber-go/zap — a fork branch with its own benchmark module, not an upstream contribution.


Backend engineer, Go and PostgreSQL — payments, billing and delivery systems. Reachable at sagar10018233@gmail.com or LinkedIn.

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  1. getvelox/velox getvelox/velox Public

    Open-source billing engine for AI products — token metering with model × token_type matrix pricing, prepaid commits + drawdown, per-customer margin/COGS. Self-hosted in your VPC.

    Go 4 1

  2. notif-service notif-service Public

    Distributed SMS notification platform in Go on AWS — SQS, RDS Postgres behind RDS Proxy, KEDA autoscaling on k3s, Terraform. Load runs are gated on SQL invariants, and the campaign evidence is reco…

    Go 1

  3. leaky-bucket-gcra leaky-bucket-gcra Public

    Redis-backed rate limiter for Go using the Generic Cell Rate Algorithm — a single Lua script, so limits stay consistent across distributed processes.

    Go

  4. user-service user-service Public

    User authentication service in Go — Google OIDC sign-in (Authorization Code + PKCE, state-validated callback), JWT with pinned signing algorithm, hashed session tokens, bcrypt credentials.

    Go