This book presents a detailed exposition of models of incentives in political economy using the tools of contemporary information economics. The emphasis is on small, loosely connected models that describe the rationale behind many of today's political procedures, while paying attention to the intellectual history of the ideas that are discussed. A number of topics in constitutional design are detailed including corruption, separation of powers, and reciprocal supervision. The book is also concerned with the relationship between economists and politicians and looks at the trade‐off between dis ... More

This book presents a detailed exposition of models of incentives in political economy using the tools of contemporary information economics. The emphasis is on small, loosely connected models that describe the rationale behind many of today's political procedures, while paying attention to the intellectual history of the ideas that are discussed. A number of topics in constitutional design are detailed including corruption, separation of powers, and reciprocal supervision. The book is also concerned with the relationship between economists and politicians and looks at the trade‐off between discretion and economic efficiency. Topics in industrial policy and environmental policy are reconsidered from a political economy point of view, emphasizing the role played by politicians, elections, and interest groups in the choice of policy instruments. Additionally, the optimal choice of government centralization is discussed.