Nephew allegedly demands share in 5.5-acre ancestral land or Rs 1.5 crore; uncle’s family files FIR against him; SC quashes criminal case for this reason

The Supreme Court recently observed that criminal process cannot be permitted to become a weapon of harassment and coercion in disputes concerning title over property and thus on this ground quashed an FIR against a family that had been filed by one of its members.

This judgement came against the background of a property dispute case involving a family over 5.5 acres of ancestral land in Panas Village, near Surat, Gujarat. As per the submission to the court, this land was jointly purchased on June 3, 1957, by the six children of Nemabhai Patel, including Govindbhai Patel (the father of the appellants) and Chhaganbhai Patel, (the father of respondent No. 2).

However, respondent No. 2 claimed that the said ancestral land property belonged exclusively to his Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) while the appellants contended that they, too, possess a share in this land. This dispute led to a settlement case, and on July 21, 1987, the court granted a settlement decree to the both parties (the appellants and respondent No. 2). However, it was never acted upon, and thus became unenforceable by limitation under Article 136 of the Limitation Act.

Thereafter, on February 19, 1988, the Gujarat authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976, recognised one-third shares in favour of both parties (the appellants and respondent No. 2), thereby overriding the earlier settlement decree under Section 42. According to the appellants (Govindbhai Patel's children), this order was never challenged by respondent No. 2 (Chhaganbhai Patel's child).

However, in 1988, respondent No. 2 (Chhaganbhai Patel's child) allegedly procured a fraudulent compromise decree dated November 28, 1988, and used a fictitious person, "Kishorbhai Govindbhai Patel," and filed a special civil case (No. 176/1988) and, based on the said compromise decree, put his name in the ancestral land mutation records in 1991.

Also read: Man added his name to ancestral land records using common surname trick; Karnataka HC restores land to original owners

The appellants (Govindbhai Patel's children) allege that this mutation (Mutation Entry No. 2183 dated June 1, 1991) in the revenue records were made without following the prescribed procedure under the Gujarat Land Revenue Code, 1879.

Subsequently, on August 5, 2000, the appellants (Govindbhai Patel's children) filed a civil case in court (No. 377/2000) seeking declaration of their two-third share in the property. In this civil case, the high court had granted an interim injunction in the appellant's favour on February 20, 2002, which was subsequently made absolute on July 22, 2003.

The injunction was essentially to protect the property and maintain the status quo during the pendency of the ownership title dispute.

However, on November 1, 2001, the five children (accused No. 1 to 5) of Govindbhai Patel executed a power of attorney in favour of their brother (accused No. 6) for conducting the civil proceedings on behalf of their family.

Also read: Son denies share of ancestral property to 6 half sisters; Andhra Pradesh HC give relief to the sisters and orders property partition

According to the appellants (Govindbhai Patel's children), the execution of the power of attorney was consistently affirmed before various courts and was never disputed by respondent No. 2 (Chhaganbhai Patel's child) during the civil litigation.

Subsequently, the appellants (Govindbhai Patel's children) on April 13, 2003, filed an FIR (No. 136/2003) against respondent No. 2 (Chhaganbhai Patel's child) in relation to forgery committed and the fraudulent decree obtained in Special Civil Suit No. 176/1988. The police filed a chargesheet against respondent No. 2 on August 10, 2004.

However, nearly five years later, on May 21, 2009, respondent No. 2 (Chhaganbhai Patel's child) filed an FIR (first FIR) against the appellants (Govindbhai Patel's children) in the DCB Police Station. Thereafter, on December 31, 2009, suppressing the earlier FIR and complaint, respondent No. 2 lodged another complaint before the Special Operations Group, and the police registered a second FIR (No. I-CR No. 504/2009).

In this second FIR, respondent no. 2 (Chhaganbhai Patel's child) for the first time mentioned that the appellants (Govindbhai Patel's children) had put pressure on him to give them a partnership share in the ancestral land or pay Rs 1.5 crore.

Also read: Ancestral land claim fails: Mutation records not proof of ownership, HC rejects brothers’ claim over land held by religious trust

The second FIR filed in 2009 said that the alleged incidents occurred between 2001 and 2002, especially the alleged Rs 1.5 crore demand in February 2002. So, respondent No. 2 filed the FIR after more than seven years of the appellants filing the property title civil case in court in 2000.

This is how the dispute unfolded. The appellants claimed a two-thirds share in the 5.5-acre ancestral land, but the respondent No. 2 claimed exclusive and full ownership of the land solely on the basis of the alleged fraudulent 1988 decree.

This property title dispute case is now with another bench of the Supreme Court and is not discussed here. This article is about the second FIR filed by respondent no. 2, which is now quashed by the Supreme Court.

Keep reading to know how the family members got relief from the criminal case due to the second FIR filed by respondent No. 2.

Also read: Calling property ‘ancestral’ isn’t enough: Courts demand clear chain of title and documentary proof

Why was the 2nd FIR quashed?

Advocate Mayank Arora, Partner, The Chambers of Bharat Chugh, said to ET Wealth Online that this judgment is significant because it brings together and applies several well-established principles governing the quashing of criminal proceedings.

Arora says that the Supreme Court reiterated that mere drafting of an FIR in language that reproduces the statutory ingredients of an offence cannot prevent judicial scrutiny. Where mala fides, vengeance or abuse of process are alleged, the Court is entitled and even duty-bound to examine the surrounding circumstances, the chronology, earlier complaints between the parties.

Arora says: "In this case the Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the FIR because the criminal prosecution by the family members was found to be an attempt to give a criminal colour to a long-standing intra-family civil dispute concerning title to ancestral property."

The Supreme Court found the allegations in the FIR, even if were accepted at face value, still the essential ingredients of forgery, cheating, extortion, criminal intimidation and conspiracy were not made out. The chronology played an important role in this case.

Civil proceedings regarding ownership of the property were pending since 2000 and had travelled through several rounds of litigation. Yet, during those proceedings, the complainants had never alleged that the accused had committed extortion, forgery, intimidation or conspiracy. These allegations related to the criminal offences occurring around 2001, but surfaced much later in the criminal proceedings.

The court considered the absence of such allegations from the contemporaneous civil pleadings to be a significant circumstance while testing the genuineness of the subsequent prosecution.

The Supreme Court also noticed that the complainant’s first police complaint dated May 21, 2009 contained no allegation of a demand for money, extortion, criminal intimidation or threats. Seven months later, the impugned FIR was introduced, for the first time, and allegations that ₹1.5 crore had been demanded by the accused persons.

The Supreme Court held that this was not a minor elaboration. It was a material improvement that altered the complexion of the dispute itself. The suppression of the earlier complaint and the introduction of grave allegations in the subsequent FIR supported the conclusion that the criminal case was an afterthought and intended to exert pressure in the pending property dispute.

The unexplained delay in filing of the FIR was another decisive circumstance. The alleged incidents in the FIR pertained to 2001, whereas the FIR was registered only on 31 December 2009. The complainant had remained actively engaged in civil litigation throughout this period and had access to all statutory remedies including seeking registration of an FIR or filing a criminal complaint before the Magistrate.

Arora says that while examining each alleged offence separately the Hon’ble court observed as follows:

• For forgery, the Court held that the foundation of the offence is the making of a “false document”. The Power of Attorney in question had admittedly been executed by the persons whose signatures appeared on it.
• There was no allegation of impersonation, fabricated signatures or a document being created in the name of somebody who had not executed it. Merely executing a document on the basis of a disputed or even an ultimately unsustainable claim of ownership does not, by itself, amount to making a false document. A disputed assertion of title cannot automatically be converted into forgery.

• For cheating, the Court reiterated that there must be deception, fraudulent or dishonest inducement, dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction and a resulting delivery of property or valuable security. The FIR did not allege that the complainant had delivered any money, property or valuable security based on any representation made by the accused. Nor did the material establish dishonest intention at the inception by the accused persons. The existence of a competing claim to title could not, without more, be treated as fraudulent representation.

The court further observed that the allegation of extortion was also deficient. The FIR did not specify the date, place or circumstances in which the alleged demand of ₹1.5 crore was made. More importantly, there was no allegation that the complainant had actually delivered money or property as a result of the alleged threat, which is an essential ingredient of completed extortion. The Court also rejected the mechanical attempts by the complainants to invoke Section 511 IPC to describe the allegation as an attempt to commit extortion.

Finally, the Court reconciled its decision with the principle in Neeharika Infrastructure where it was held that courts should ordinarily avoid interfering with an investigation at the threshold. That principle is one of caution, not judicial abdication.

Arora says: "The Supreme Court clarified that where no cognizable offence is disclosed, the proceeding is manifestly mala fide, or its continuation would constitute an abuse of process, the High Courts are duty-bound to exercise thier inherent jurisdiction and quash such proceedings."

Supreme Court order and discussion

The Supreme Court, in its judgement on May 22, 2026, said that the delay in the registration of the FIR is something that cannot be ignored, as the incidents pertain to the year 2001, whereas the FIR (the second FIR) came to be registered only on December 31, 2009, after a delay of nearly eight to nine years.

When respondent No. 2 was asked about this long delay, he said that a government circular dated July 23, 2003, discouraged registration of FIRs involving civil disputes. The Gujarat High Court accepted this explanation.

Also read: US-based daughter goes to court against parents, seeking share in family land; Karnataka HC rejects her claim; here’s why

However, the Supreme Court did not accept this explanation and said that the circular itself cannot explain the inaction by respondent No. 2 between 2001 and 2009, particularly when respondent No. 2 was actively litigating before competent courts throughout the said period and had access to all legal remedies, including under Sections 154(3), 156(3) and 200 of the CrPC.

The Supreme Court said that in their view, the subsequent introduction of allegations of extortion, demand of money and intimidation in the second complaint (the second FIR) materially alters the nature and complexion of the dispute and supports the contention of the appellants that the criminal proceedings are an afterthought intended to give criminal colour to a long-standing civil dispute.

Though respondent No. 2 contended that the subsequent FIR merely elaborated upon earlier allegations, the Supreme Court said that, in their opinion, the allegation of extortion, which is one of the grave accusations in the FIR, was absent in the first FIR and surfaced only subsequently.

The Supreme Court said: "Thus, such material improvements cannot be ignored while examining whether the criminal process is being abused or not."

The Supreme Court also referred to its earlier ruling (Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P. (2023) 20 SCC 219) to reiterate that courts must closely scrutinise criminal proceedings that appear manifestly vexatious or motivated by personal vendetta, reported Verdictum.

The Supreme Court also said that merely executing documents asserting a disputed property title ownership claim does not amount to making a "false document" under Section 464 of the IPC.

Thus, the Supreme Court said that the present case, viewed in its peculiar facts and circumstances, constitutes all the characteristics of a civil property dispute, which is sought to be converted into criminal proceedings after several years of civil litigation.

The Supreme Court said: "We are of the opinion that the criminal process cannot be permitted to become a weapon of harassment and coercion in disputes concerning title over immovable property."

Order:
? The impugned common judgment and order dated November 7, 2023, passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 780 of 2010 and Special Criminal Application No. 620 of 2010 is hereby set aside.
? FIR No. I-CR No. 504/2009 dated 31.12.2009 registered with Umra Police Station, Surat, for offences punishable under Sections 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 504, 120-B, 384, 511, and 114 of the IPC and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, including any charge-sheet filed pursuant thereto, are hereby quashed and set aside qua the appellants.
? It is clarified that observations made hereinabove are confined solely to adjudication under Section 482 of the CrPC and shall not influence adjudication of pending civil proceedings concerning title and ownership over the suit property.